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Abstract 
The observed proportionality between nominal prices and average embodied energies cannot be 
interpreted with conventional economic theory. A model is presented that places energy transfers 
as the focal point of scarcity based on the idea that (1) goods are material rearrangements, and 
(2) humans can only rearrange matter with energy transfers. Modified consumer and producer 
problems for an autarkic agent show that the opportunity cost of goods are given by their 
marginal energy transfers, which depend on subjective and objective factors (e.g. consumer 
preferences and direct energy transfers). Allowing for exchange and under perfect competition, 
nominal prices arise as social manifestations of goods’ marginal energy transfers. The 
proportionality between nominal prices and average embodied energy follows given the relation 
between the latter and marginal energy transfers. 
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Nomenclature 
𝑄𝑓,𝑡 Demand of final good f during 𝑡 
𝑄𝑒,𝑡 Demand of energy good 𝑒  
𝑄𝑙,𝑡 Demand of prime mover (PM) 𝑙  
𝜏𝑘,𝑡
𝐴  Av. energy transfer of any good 𝑘 
𝜏𝑘,𝑡 Mg. energy transfer of good 𝑘 
𝜇𝑘 Quantity elasticity (QE) of 𝜏𝑘,𝑡
𝐴  
𝜂𝑘 QE of average embodied energy of 𝑘 
𝐸𝑡 Energy surplus 
𝜆𝑡 Marginal utility of energy surplus 
𝛽𝑡,𝑖 𝑖-period discount factor at 𝑡 
𝜓𝑘,𝑡 Direct energy transfers on 𝑘 
𝜃𝑘,𝑡 Av. power scarcity cost of mg. 𝑘 
Γ𝑘,𝑡 Embodied energy of PM producing 𝑘  
𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡 Quantity of 𝑙 producing 𝑘 
?̃?𝑙,𝑡 Endowment of 𝑙 
𝜀𝑙 𝑙’s direct energy transfer 
𝑝𝑙 𝑙’s power rate 
𝜙𝑙,𝑡 𝑙’s power scarcity cost/energy surplus 
𝑑𝑙 𝑙’s depreciation rate 
𝑔−𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
′   Mg. req. of production function 
𝛿𝑒 Energy good 𝑒’s energy content 
Θ𝑡 Over-assignment of energy surplus 
Λ𝑓,𝑡 Energy assigned per unit of 𝑓 
𝑝c Commodity price 
𝑝𝑘  Real price of any good 𝑘 
𝑃𝑘 Nominal price of any good k 
𝜏𝑚  Mg. energy transfer of real money 
𝜏𝑠 Syn. energy transf. of nom. money 
𝑄𝑚 Quantity of real money 
𝑄𝑛 Quantity of nominal money 
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1. Introduction 
Nominal prices and average embodied energies1 seem to be directly proportional (Gutowski et 
al., 2013; Liu et al., 2008). Economic theory cannot explain this proportionality because if 
energy is like any other input (as conventional theory suggests), energy’s cost share should be 
systematically high, yet estimates are consistently below 10% (Ayres et al., 2013; Csereklyei et 
al., 2016; Lindenberger & Kümmel, 2011). 
Other interpretations are unavailable with neoclassical micro theory and all leading macro 
theories because energy is not part of their core constructs (Jehle & Reny, 2011; Mas-Colell et 
al., 1995; Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2004; Silberberg & Suen, 2001). Such omission is surprising 
considering the accepted truths that (1) goods are material rearrangements (Ryan & Pearce, 
1985; von Mises, 1949), and (2) humans can only rearrange matter with energy transfers. 
Together, these ideas suggest that means are energy transfers, as supply depends on the factors 
that influence energy transfers: primarily the energy goods that provide energy (e.g. rice, oil) and 
prime movers that transfer it (e.g. workers, engines), and secondarily whatever other factors that 
influence energy transfers processes (e.g. water, information, social norms, the environment).  
The only available alternative to economic theory that could interpret the proportionality 
between nominal prices and average embodied energies is an energy theory of value (Costanza, 
1980; Hannon, 1973; Odum, 1971). Yet, such theory creates more problems than it solves. 
Imposing that economic value is defined by the energy spent producing goods severely reduces 
or ignores the role of intra and inter-temporal preferences, other inputs, and technological 
progress (Alessio, 1981; Hertzmark, 1981; Huettner, 1982; Huettner, 1976; Webb & Pearce, 
1975). Furthermore, energy’s relevance cannot be understood independently from the prime 
movers that transfer it to rearrange matter, e.g. a barrel of oil is useless without an engine that 
can transfer its energy content to produce a good. 
Hence, why are nominal prices proportional to average embodied energies? This paper attempts 
to theoretically explain such proportionality following conventional economic rationale. The 
starting point is an autarkic agent that maximizes utility subject to an energy transfer constraint. 
Such constraint, justified with the idea that means are energy transfers, is the point of departure 
                                                          
1
 Average embodied energy is the total energy required on average to produce a unit of a good. 
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from conventional theory. Given this constraint, the paper shows how maximizing consumer and 
producer behavior reveals marginal energy transfers, what influences their magnitudes, and that 
nominal prices arise as their social representation under exchange and perfect competition. The 
proportionality under study follows given the relation between marginal energy transfers and 
average embodied energies. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 lays out a model in which an autarkic agent 
maximizes utility subject to an energy transfer constraint, and given such constraint, solves an 
array of optimization problems that must be solved for Pareto-efficiency. Section 3 extends the 
autarkic setting to analyze how exchange leads to nominal prices as representations of marginal 
energy transfers, and relates such magnitudes to average embodied energies. Section 4 provides a 
discussion on these results and section 5 concludes. 
2. A revised theory of choice 
My point of departure from traditional theory is the consideration of means as energy transfers. 
Given this proposition, utility maximization for an autarkic agent is subject to an energy transfer 
constraint, and given such constraint, an array of secondary optimization problems must be 
solved for Pareto-efficiency. This section discusses why means are energy transfers, and solves 
both primary and secondary optimization problems.   
Means are energy transfers because humans can only act by rearranging matter, and they can 
only rearrange matter with energy transfers. Even if ends are immaterial such as reputation, 
power, or love, they can only be obtained with material rearrangements such as the writing of a 
seminal paper, the conquest of a territory, and the shipment of flowers. As Adams (1982) puts it 
“Every event in history can occur only insofar as there is available whatever amount of energy 
(i.e., work) is necessary to carry it out. We can think thoughts wildly, but if we do not have the 
wherewithal to convert them into action, they will remain thoughts”. 
The proposition that means are energy transfers requires two clarifications. One is that it is 
teleological, as energy transfers are means only insofar as they do material rearrangements in 
accordance to human ends. Such rearrangements are economic goods (goods hereafter), which 
excludes free goods untouched by human action such as freely available clean air, and material 
rearrangements that do not serve human purpose such as an AC unit in the arctic.  
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The second clarification is that energy transfers are a process, not an object. The inputs enabling 
energy transfers can be categorized as energy goods providing energy (e.g. rice, oil), prime 
movers transferring such energy (e.g. laborers, engines), raw material being rearranged (e.g. 
wood, copper), and supporting inputs that enable such rearrangements (e.g. water, 
infrastructure). Thus, humanity can be constrained by its ability to transfer energy even when 
more energy reaches earth from the sun in an hour than what humanity currently uses in a year. 
Energy transfers are mostly limited by prime mover availability and the incapacity to transfer 
sunlight into energy goods at an energy surplus, but in general they can be constrained by the 
scarcity of any input. 
The constraining role of scarce inputs do not contradict the fact that energy transfers are the focal 
point of scarcity. Inputs are scarce only in relation to the amount needed to do such transfers and 
can be substituted according to their relative convenience. On the contrary, there are no 
substitutes for energy transfers as the way humans alter their surroundings, and therefore outputs 
are scarce only in relation to the amount of energy transfers they require. In a hypothetical world 
where more energy transfers could be done than those required for bringing about and 
maintaining Eden, the economic problem would cease to exist. This is why human progress is 
associated with the capacity to transfer energy (White, 1943; Cook, 1976; Weissenbacher, 2009). 
Early societies could only transfer the energy content of some types of biomass with the human 
body, while modern ones complement such transfers with the energy content of oil, uranium, 
electricity etc. transferred by diesel engines, steam turbines, computers, and a host of other prime 
movers.  
2.1 Utility maximization 
Consider a multi-period autarkic agent that faces no uncertainty and has preferences represented 
by a quasiconcave, continuous and twice-differentiable utility function of the form 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑸𝐹,1, 𝑸𝐹,2, … , 𝑸𝐹,𝑇),                                             (1) 
where 𝑇 is the agent’s planning horizon and 𝑸𝐹,𝑡 = [𝑄1,𝑡, … , 𝑄𝐹,𝑡]′ are final goods demanded in 
period 𝑡. Energy goods and prime movers are excluded from the utility function as a simplifying 
assumption and all goods are assumed perfectly divisible. The agent’s primary objective is to 
maximize 𝑈 subject to each period’s energy transfer constraint  
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            𝝉𝐹,𝑡
𝑨′ 𝑸𝐹,𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑡,           ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇                                 (2) 
where 𝝉𝐹,𝑡
𝑨′ = [𝜏1,𝑡
𝐴 , … , 𝜏𝐹,𝑡
𝐴 ]′ are final goods’ average energy transfers representing the average 
opportunity cost of producing each unit,2 and 𝐸𝑡 is the energy surplus secured in 𝑡. This 
constraint is real because it is a physical imperative that the energy transferred in the production 
of final goods (the left-hand side) does not exceed the energy surplus from where energy is 
transferred (the right-hand side). Moreover, the constraint is reasonable despite being 
unobservable and arguable unknown because this is an autarkic agent for which an observable 
monetary constraint does not exist. The relevant Lagrangian at 𝑡 = 1 is 
    ℒ𝑓 = 𝑈(𝑸𝐹,1, 𝑸𝐹,2, … , 𝑸𝐹,𝑇) + ∑ 𝜆𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 (𝐸𝑡 − 𝝉𝐹,𝑡
𝑨′ 𝑸𝐹,𝑡),           (3) 
where 𝜆𝑡 is the marginal utility of energy surplus in period 𝑡. The FOCs to choose optimal 
quantity of final good 𝑓 are 
𝑈𝑓,𝑡 𝜆𝑡⁄ = 𝜏𝑓,𝑡,   ∀ 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑡                          (4) 
where 𝜏𝑓,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑓,𝑡
𝐴 (1 + 𝜇𝑓) is good 𝑓’s marginal energy transfer, i.e. the minimum energy transfer 
required to produce one more unit of the good, and 𝜇𝑓 =
𝜕𝜏𝑓
𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝑓
𝑄𝑓
𝜏𝑓
𝐴 is the quantity elasticity of 
average energy transfer. Given that average and marginal energy transfers are exogenous for the 
agent as a consumer, the FOCs show that the agent adjusts consumption levels such that in 
equilibrium the MRS between a final good and energy surplus equals the good’s marginal energy 
transfer. Thus, marginal energy transfers reflect ratios between final goods’ contribution to the 
agent’s ends (𝑈𝑓,𝑡), and the marginal utility of its energy surplus (𝜆𝑡). The latter represents the 
general intensity of the agent’s desires: if 𝜆𝑡 is high then desires are strong, and an additional 
Joule of energy can substantially increase utility. 
The agent’s intertemporal preferences are defined by the time-shape of discount factors, where 
the 𝑖-period discount factor at 𝑡 is endogenously defined as 
𝛽𝑡,𝑖 = 𝜆𝑡+𝑖 𝜆𝑡⁄ ,    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖                    (5) 
                                                          
2
 A formal definition of energy transfers is provided in section 3.2. The problems of system boundary and co-
products are overlooked by assuming that all energy transfers can be uniquely allocated among goods. 
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and represents the MRS between energy surplus during 𝑡 + 𝑖 and 𝑡. Given this definition of 𝛽𝑡,𝑖, 
ratios of (4) shows that optimal demand for good 𝑓 𝑖-periods apart must observe  
𝑈𝑓,𝑡+𝑖 𝑈𝑓,𝑡⁄ = 𝛽𝑡,𝑖 𝜏𝑓,𝑡+𝑖 𝜏𝑓,𝑡⁄ ,    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖                    (6) 
which is consistent with Euler’s equation despite the endogenous discount factor. 𝛽𝑡,𝑖 could be 
greater than unity (Hansen & Singleton, 1983; Hotz et al., 1988; Hurd, 1989) because the relative 
magnitudes of 𝜆𝑡 depend on the relative magnitudes of 𝐸𝑡, or in other words, because an agent’s 
time preference depends on the time-shape of his income stream (Fisher, 1930). If 𝛽𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 1 ∀ 𝑖, 
which is consistent with the growth of energy surplus over time, then 𝛽𝑡,𝑖 is non-increasing in 𝑖, 
and typically decreasing. Yet, 𝛽𝑡,𝑖 can increase (or decrease) over 𝑡 while decreasing over 𝑖. 
2.2 Marginal energy transfers  
Minimizing direct energy transfers in the production of any good 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is a Pareto-efficient 
condition to maximize utility because it is required to minimize the left-hand side of the energy 
budget constraint in (2). The resolution of this problem, detailed in part A of the appendix, shows 
that good 𝑘’s marginal energy transfer is  
          𝜏𝑘,𝑡 = 𝜓𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑘,𝑡, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑡              (7) 
where 𝜓𝑘,𝑡 =
1
𝐿
∑ 𝜀𝑙𝑔−𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
′𝐿
𝑙=1  is the average direct energy transfers required to produce one more 
unit of good 𝑘, and 𝜃𝑘,𝑡 =
1
𝐿
∑ 𝜙𝑙,𝑡𝑔−𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
′𝐿
𝑙=1  is the average power scarcity cost in the production 
of an additional unit of good 𝑘. Power scarcity costs are due to limited prime movers, and thus 
marginal energy transfers account for both energy goods and prime movers. Moreover, 𝐿 is the 
quantity of prime mover types used by the agent, and for any type 𝑙, 𝜀𝑙 = ∫ 𝑝𝑙
𝑡+1
𝑡
𝑑𝑡 is the direct 
energy transfer, 𝑝𝑙 is the effective power rate, 𝑔−𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
′ = 𝑓𝑙,𝑘
−1 is the marginal requirements of 
production function (with 𝑓𝑙,𝑘 the marginal productivity in the production of good 𝑘), and 𝜙𝑙,𝑡 is 
the power scarcity cost. A prime mover’s power scarcity cost derives from its limited 
availability, and is measured in Joules as it reflects the energy surplus that could be secured with 
an additional unit of a prime mover (see part B of the appendix). 
Equation (7) shows that marginal energy transfers are endogenous for the agent as a producer, 
and depends on prime movers’ power rate, productivity, and scarcity. Marginal energy transfer 
change upon changes in 𝜀𝑙 due to variations in effective power rates, in 𝑔−𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
′  due to changes in 
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management or the environment, and in 𝜙𝑙,𝑡 due to shifts in demand for 𝑙 in the production of 
any good. In a world with uncertainty, new prime movers and energy goods introduced in a 
period 𝑡1 would shock the values of 𝜏𝑘,𝑡≥𝑡1  by modifying 𝑔−𝑙,𝑘,𝑡≥𝑡1
′  and 𝜙𝑙,𝑡≥𝑡1
 respectively. 
2.3 Equilibrium magnitudes 
Marginal energy transfers are defined by (7), but in equilibrium they equal expressions that vary 
according to the nature of good 𝑘. These expressions are derived from three distinct optimization 
procedures. Their resolution, alongside energy transfer minimization, is a Pareto-efficient 
condition for utility maximization. The first optimization procedure is energy surplus 
maximization, which is required to maximize the right-hand side of the energy transfer constraint 
in (2). The resolution of this problem (part B of the appendix) shows that in equilibrium the 
marginal energy transfer of energy good 𝑒 ∈ 𝜖 ∈ 𝐾 is  
       𝜏𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡,1𝛿𝑒 ,    ∀ 𝑒 ∈ 𝜖, 𝑡         (8) 
where 𝛽𝑡,1 is the one-period ahead discount factor during 𝑡 and 𝛿𝑒 is good 𝑒’s energy content in 
Joules.3 Equation (8) implies that energy goods’ marginal energy transfers are influenced by their 
energy content and the agent’s intertemporal preferences, as in equilibrium the agent equates 
energy goods’ opportunity cost to the discounted energy income they provide. 
The second procedure is optimal prime mover accumulation, which is required to minimize the 
left-hand side of the energy transfer constraint in (2). The resolution of this problem, (part C of 
the appendix) shows that in equilibrium the marginal energy transfer of prime mover 𝑙 is 
𝜏𝑙,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡,𝑖𝜙𝑙,𝑖+1𝑑𝑙
𝑖−1𝑇
𝑖=1 ,    ∀ 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, 𝑡                (9) 
where 𝛽𝑡,𝑖 is the 𝑖th-period ahead discount factor during 𝑡 and 𝑑𝑙 ∈ (0,1) is 𝑙’s linear 
depreciation rate. Given that 𝜙𝑙,𝑡 can be interpreted as prime movers’ marginal energy surplus 
(see part B of the appendix), equation (9) implies that at equilibrium, the opportunity cost of 
prime movers —i.e. their marginal energy transfer— equals the future flow of discounted net 
energy surplus that they generate. By extension, the opportunity cost of all assets is the present 
value of the flow of energy surplus that they generate, or as Fisher (1930) puts it “The value of 
any property is its value as a source of income and is found by discounting that expected 
                                                          
3
 We overlook other features of energy goods, such as density and cleanness. For a discussion on energy goods see 
Cleveland et al., (2000), Podobnik (2005), Stern (2010), Bhattacharyya (2011), and Smil (2016). 
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income”. Furthermore, although prime movers produce the energy goods that build energy 
surplus, with the relation going from the former to the latter, the value of such prime movers is 
determined by the energy surplus they secure, with the relation going from the latter to the 
former. In short, “Income values produce capital values” (Fisher, 1930). 
The third and last optimization procedure is optimal allocation of energy surplus, which is 
required for the quantities produced and demanded of final goods to be equal. The resolution of 
this problem, (part D of the appendix) shows that in equilibrium the marginal energy transfer of 
final good 𝑓 is 
𝜏𝑓,𝑡 = (1 − Θ𝑡)Λ𝑓,𝑡,   ∀ 𝑓, 𝑡         (10) 
where Θ𝑡 ∈ [0,1) is a measure of the agent’s over-assignment of energy surplus during 𝑡, and 
Λ𝑓,𝑡 is the energy assigned by the agent to the production of each unit of final good 𝑓. Equation 
(10) implies that final goods’ marginal energy transfer is influenced by their energy assignments 
and excess of energy assignments.  
Using equations (4) and (10) shows that effective energy assignments are  
                    (1 − Θ𝑡)Λ𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑓,𝑡/𝜆𝑡,  ∀ 𝑓, 𝑡           (11) 
where the right-hand side is the MRS between a final good and energy surplus. Thus, the agent 
chooses consumption levels as a consumer such that the endogenous marginal utility of final 
goods leads to a MRS with respect to energy surplus equal to the good’s exogenous marginal 
energy transfer. Also, the agent chooses production levels as a producer such that the 
endogenous marginal energy transfer of final goods equal the goods’ exogenous effective energy 
assignments. Equilibrium is reached when effective energy assignments equal the MRS between 
goods and energy surplus. 
3. A revised theory of price 
Under autarky no nominal prices exist. This section allows exchange to take place between 
previously autarkic agents, and shows how nominal prices arise through exchange and 
competition as social representations of marginal energy transfers. Furthermore, the section 
formally relates nominal prices to average embodied energies. 
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Agents have incentives to engage in exchange because, in general, doing so further increases 
their utility. Exchange leads to gains from trade from the lowering of marginal energy transfers, 
which relaxes their energy transfer constraints. These gains follow conventional Ricardian logic. 
3.1 Commodity prices 
Assume two previously autarkic agents exchange two goods and consume them in the same 
quantities as under autarky. Also assume exchange takes place in a single period such that the 
time subscript can be omitted. If “agent 1” exchanges 𝑞𝐵 units of good B for 𝑞𝐶 units of good C 
with “agent 2”, the gains from trade (𝐺𝑇) are 
𝐺𝑇 = ∫ (𝜏𝐵
2𝑞𝐵
𝐴
𝑞𝐵
𝐸 − 𝜏𝐵
1 )𝑑𝑞𝐵 + ∫ (𝜏𝐶
1𝑞𝐶
𝐴
𝑞𝐶
𝐸 − 𝜏𝐶
2)𝑑𝑞𝐶 − 𝑇𝐶             (12) 
where 𝑞𝑖
𝐴 and 𝑞𝑖
𝐸 are the quantities produced of good 𝑖 = 𝐵, 𝐶 under autarky and exchange 
respectively, and where 𝑞𝐵 = 𝑞𝐵
𝐴 − 𝑞𝐵
𝐸 and 𝑞𝐶 = 𝑞𝐶
𝐴 − 𝑞𝐶
𝐸. The positive terms are savings from 
reduced production; the negative ones are spending from increased production; and 𝑇𝐶 are 
transaction costs due to transportation, spoilage, etc. When 𝐺𝑇 > 0 there are unambiguous gains 
from trade because production and consumption of both goods is the same under exchange as 
under autarky, but at lower average energy transfers. Gains from trade are a “release” of energy 
surplus that the agents can use to produce other goods. If under autarky 𝜏𝐵
1 < 𝜏𝐵
2  and 𝜏𝐶
1 > 𝜏𝐶
2 
(𝜏𝐵
1 < 𝜏𝐵
2 and 𝜏𝐶
1 < 𝜏𝐶
2) there are absolute (relative) comparative advantages.  
For the unambiguous gains from trade to benefit both agents, the rate of exchange of goods 
𝑞𝐵/𝑞𝐶 (i.e. their commodity price) must remain between agents’ reservation values. Such values 
are 𝜏𝐶
1 𝜏𝐵
1⁄  for agent 1 and 𝜏𝐶
2 𝜏𝐵
2⁄  for agent 2. The commodity price that will govern this 
exchange is between agents’ reservation values, yet nothing more is known as both agents are 
monopolies of the good they produce, and monopsonies of the other one. The exact commodity 
price will depend on site-specific features such as negotiating abilities. 
Changes in marginal and average energy transfers alter each agent’s entire schedule of 
production and consumption. As shown in Figure 1, the intersection between a good's demand 
and marginal energy transfer curve (METC) yields equilibrium production and consumption 
under autarky. The agent in the left diagram has a relatively lower METC, and under exchange 
will produce more relative to autarky. Faced with a higher marginal energy transfer τE′ > τE, 
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this agent will demand less, and the difference will be exported (E). The agent in the right 
diagram, faced with a lower marginal energy transfer τI′ < τI, will produce less and demand 
more. The difference are imports (I). Under exchange, the marginal energy transfer of both 
agents is the same τE′ = τI′. 
Without the assumption that the agents' consumption remains the same after exchange there are 
still unambiguous gains for both agents if GT > 0 and if the rate of exchange of goods is 
between agents' reservation values. If an agent willingly reduces the consumption of a good as 
compared to autarky, doing so must provide the agent with another good that yields more utility. 
                      Figure 1: Changes in demand and supply due to exchange. 
The optimal rate of exchange of goods is given by maximizing (12) choosing 𝑞𝐵 and 𝑞𝐶. With 
either good the FOC is 
𝜏𝑖
𝐼 = 𝜏𝑖
𝐸 + 𝑀𝑇𝐶𝑖          (13) 
where 𝜏𝑖
𝐼 is the marginal energy transfer of good 𝑖 = 𝐵, 𝐶 of the importing agent 𝐼 = 1,2, 𝜏𝑖
𝐸  is 
the marginal energy transfer of good 𝑖 of the exporting agent 𝐸 = 1,2, and 𝑀𝑇𝐶𝑖 is the marginal 
transaction cost of good 𝑖. This condition sets the patterns of trade: until (13) is observed, agents 
with relatively lower marginal energy transfers will export a good, while those with relatively 
higher ones will import it. If 𝑇𝐶 = 0 (assumed hereafter), the optimal quantity exchanged by the 
agents equalizes the marginal energy transfer of each good between agents (Figure 1).  
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Under (11) the agents exchange 𝑞𝐵
∗  for 𝑞𝐶
∗ , and the prevailing marginal energy transfers are 𝜏𝐵 
and 𝜏𝐶. Marginal energy transfers are the same for both agents given 𝑀𝑇𝐶𝑖 = 0. Thus, optimal 
exchange implies the commodity price 
𝑞𝐵 𝑞𝐶⁄ = 𝑝
𝑐 = 𝜏𝐶 𝜏𝐵⁄ .          (14) 
The condition in (13) and the price associated with it in (14) materializes through competition. 
Adding more agents to the exchange of goods A and B makes negotiation abilities and other site-
specific features progressively irrelevant. As monopolistic and monopsonistic positions are lost, 
Nash equilibrium brought about by tâtonnement leads to the collapse of the range of possible 
commodity prices at the ratio of marginal energy transfers under exchange 𝜏𝐶 𝜏𝐴⁄ . 
3.2 Real and nominal prices 
Even a modest number of 𝐾 goods make barter inviable. Agents convene on using real money 
(i.e. commodity money or general equivalent) to solve this problem (Menger, 1892; Schumpeter, 
1954). If compliant with certain characteristics (Einzig, 1966), real money solves the problem of 
double coincidence of wants as a medium of exchange, facilitates savings as a store of value, 
enables debt as a unit of deferred payments, and reduces the number of commodity prices from 
𝐾! to 𝐾 − 1 as a unit of account ( Karimzadi, 2013; Schumpeter, 2014; Smithin, 2014).  
Despite acquiring such attributes, real money is first and foremost a good such as cowries, cows, 
or gold (Cribb, 1986), and therefore has its own marginal energy transfer 𝜏𝑚. Given (14), the 
commodity price of commodity 𝑘 in terms of real money, i.e. its real price, is  
 𝑝𝑘 = 𝜏𝑘 𝜏𝑚⁄ , (15) 
which can have complex movements as both 𝜏𝑘 and 𝜏𝑚 can be simultaneously changing. For 
example, 𝜏𝑚 can increase due to depletion of gold deposits, and 𝜏𝑘 can fall due to innovations 
reducing energy transfers or investments reducing prime mover constraints. 
Given the hurdles inherent in using real money (Karimzadi, 2013), societies further facilitate 
exchange by adopting nominal money as a representation of real money (Poor, 1969). Nominal 
money, also called representative money or currency, does not derive its rate of exchange with 
other goods from its own marginal energy transfer. Nominal money such as pesos, dollars, and 
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euros have a “synthetic energy transfer” established by applying (14) between real and nominal 
money. The synthetic energy transfer of nominal money, i.e. its purchasing power, is 
 𝜏𝑠 = 𝜏𝑚𝑄𝑚 𝑄𝑛⁄  (16) 
where 𝑄𝑚 and 𝑄𝑛 are respectively the total quantities of real and nominal money in an economy. 
Inverting, logging, and differentiating (16) shows the rate of decrease of the purchasing power of 
nominal money, i.e. inflation, as  
                                                 𝜋 = 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑄𝑛 𝑄𝑚⁄ ) − 𝑑ln (𝜏𝑚),                      (17) 
where 𝜋 = 𝑑𝑙𝑛(1 𝜏𝑠⁄ ). Given (14), the real price of commodity 𝑘 in terms of nominal money, i.e. 
its nominal price, is  
 𝑃𝑘 = 𝜏𝑘 𝜏𝑠⁄ , (18) 
which holds for all goods regardless if they are final, energetic, or prime movers. Thus, when 
agents engage in exchange using nominal money and prices, it is unknown and irrelevant to them 
that marginal energy transfers are defined according to (7) and expressed according to (18). The 
same is true regarding how marginal energy transfers of energy goods, prime movers, and final 
goods are influenced according to (8), (9), and (10) respectively. Under the cloak of nominal 
prices all goods appear equal. 
The movements of nominal prices also contribute to such mimetization. Logging and 
differentiating (18), and replacing using (16) shows the rate of change of nominal prices as 
                                                 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑘) = 𝑑 ln(𝑝𝑘) + 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑄𝑛 𝑄𝑚⁄ ),           (19) 
which implies that all nominal prices are affected by the same common nominal component 
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑄𝑛 𝑄𝑚⁄ ). Equation (19) shows that nominal prices experience more complex movements 
than real prices, as the former contains the latter and is additionally influenced by the rate of 
growth of the ratio of nominal money to real money. In fact, 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑄𝑛 𝑄𝑚⁄ ) can lead to drastic 
changes in nominal prices (e.g. expansive monetary policies or trade deficits under the gold 
standard) even when changes in the real component is zero, i.e. 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑘) = 0. Logically, if most 
of these variables remain stable, then nominal and real prices can be mostly stable. Thus, 
equation (19) interprets the existence of waves of price equilibriums and price revolutions as 
documented in Fischer (1996), although such interpretation exceeds the scope of this article. 
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Caution must be taken when nominal money is replaced with fiat money. Then, 𝜏𝑠 stops being 
defined by (16) and thus the following equations become invalid. In such context, 𝜏𝑠 starts 
depending on the trust that agents have on the issuer of fiat money. The debate between 
Chartalism (Wray, 2012) and Metallism (Menger, 1892) exceeds the scope of this paper.  
The ratios of real prices offset the variability in real prices that stem from the marginal energy 
transfer of real money. Considering commodities 𝐴 and 𝐵 ∈ 𝐾 with real prices 𝑝𝐴 = 𝜏𝐴 𝜏𝑚⁄  and 
𝑝𝐵 = 𝜏𝐵 𝜏𝑚⁄  shows that their relative real price equals the ratio of their marginal energy transfers  
                                                  𝑝𝐴 𝑝𝐵⁄ =
𝜏𝐴 𝜏𝑚⁄
𝜏𝐵 𝜏𝑚⁄
= 𝜏𝐴 𝜏𝐵⁄ . 
(20) 
Similarly, relative nominal prices offset the variability in nominal prices that stem from the 
purchasing power of nominal money, and they also offset the effect of fiat money. Considering 
nominal prices 𝑃𝐴 = 𝜏𝐴 𝜏𝑠⁄  and 𝑃𝐵 = 𝜏𝐵 𝜏𝑠⁄  shows that their relative nominal price also equals 
the ratio of their marginal energy transfers 
                                                             𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐵⁄ =
𝜏𝐴 𝜏𝑠⁄
𝜏𝐵 𝜏𝑠⁄
= 𝜏𝐴 𝜏𝐵⁄ .           (21) 
3.3 The proportionality between prices and embodied energies 
Equations (16) and (19) do not directly interpret the proportionality under study because they 
contain marginal energy transfers instead of average embodied energies. Yet, they come close as 
both concepts are tied by the direct energy transfers required to produce goods. Good 𝑘’s 
marginal embodied energy can be decomposed as 
                                                                      𝛾𝑘 = 𝜓𝑘 + 𝛤𝑘,             (22) 
where 𝜓𝑘 is good 𝑘’s marginal direct energy transfer as described in (7) and 𝛤𝑘 is the average 
energy transfers used to build the prime movers producing the marginal unit of 𝑘. Thus, marginal 
energy transfers and embodied energies coincide regarding direct energy transfers yet differ 
regarding indirect transfers. Embodied energies are backward-looking by considering as indirect 
transfers the energy used in the past to produce the prime movers doing direct transfers 
(Chapman, 1974; IFIAS, 1974). Energy transfers are forward-looking by considering as indirect 
transfers the power scarcity of prime movers doing direct transfers. As this measure is 
determined by prime movers’ potential to provide energy surplus in the future and have no 
relation to the past, energy transfers recognize that “bygones are forever bygones”. 
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Given (7) and (22), marginal energy transfers and embodied energies are related as  
                                                              𝜏𝑘 = 𝛾𝑘 + (𝜃𝑘 − 𝛤𝑘),            (23) 
such that they differ according to the difference between prime movers’ potential to provide 
energy surplus and the energy transferred to produce them. Another reason equations (18) and 
(21) fail to interpret the proportionality under study is because they contain marginal values, 
while estimates of embodied energies are of average embodied energies or of random samples of 
the marginal embodied energy curve. As in either case the most reasonable assumption is that 
available estimates are averages, then replacing (18) with (23) and noting that 𝛾𝑘 = 𝛾𝑘
𝐴(1 + 𝜂𝑘) 
leads to nominal prices as 
𝑃𝑘 =
𝛾𝑘
𝐴(1+𝜂𝑘)+(𝜃𝑘−𝛤𝑘)
𝜏𝑠
,            (24) 
where 𝜂𝑘 =
𝜕𝛾𝑘
𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝑘
𝑄𝑘
𝛾𝑘
𝐴 is good 𝑘’s industry-wide quantity elasticity of average embodied energy. 
Equation (24) interprets the proportionality under study by indicating a noisy positive relation 
between nominal prices and average embodied energies. The noise is due to differences between 
the energy transferred to produce prime movers and their potential to provide energy surplus, 
differences between marginal and average values, and inflation. 
To control for the effect of inflation, the ratio of (24) for any two commodities 𝐴 and 𝐵 ∈ 𝐾 is 
                                                             
𝑃𝐴
𝑃𝐵
=
𝛾𝐴
𝐴(1+𝜂𝐴)+(𝜃𝐴−𝛤𝐴)
𝛾𝐵
𝐴(1+𝜂𝐵)+(𝜃𝐵−𝛤𝐵)
.            (25) 
This equation shows that, ceteris paribus, goods with relatively lower returns to scale (higher 
𝜂 𝑘) will command a relatively higher nominal price than what their relative average embodied 
energy alone would suggest.  
4. Discussion 
The proportionality between market prices and average embodied energies is a consequence of 
recognizing energy transfers as the means available to human ends. Nominal prices represent 
marginal energy transfers, and such transfers are related to average embodied energies. The 
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proportionality under study is noisy due to the differences between energy transfers and 
embodied energies, the difference between marginal and average embodied energy, and inflation. 
The model presented is mostly consistent with conventional economic theory. Economics is the 
study of human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means (Robbins, 1932); 
means are simply energy transfers. Production is not creation but transformation through 
arrangement (Ryan & Pearce, 1985; von Mises, 1949); arrangements are simply argued to be a 
material process associated with energy transfers. Production consists of the rendering of 
services by human agencies (Friedman, 1962; Knight, 1935); services are simply specified as 
energy transfers and human agencies as prime movers.4 The cost of a service in producing a good 
is the other goods it could produce (Stigler, 1987); the Joule only measures the quantity of goods 
that are being sacrificed. In summary, we can recognize means as energy transfers and agree 
with all fundamental laws of neoclassical microeconomics (Rappaport, 1998). 
Disagreements between conventional theory and this model stem from energy’s place in 
economics. While energy is ignored by the former, the latter recognizes that energy transfers are 
the means by which humans act. This leads to several divergences, the two most important being 
the understanding of the limiting factors of production and growth, and the acceptance of a 
physical unit of value. These novelties signal where this perspective provides new insights into 
economic phenomena. The first one suggests that growth is constraint by whatever hinders the 
capacity to transfer more energy, and therefore highlights the importance of prime mover 
accumulation, efficiency enhancements, and energy goods’ energy surplus. The second suggests 
that by measuring the opportunity cost of goods in Joules, market prices can be interpreted as 
social manifestations of underlying energy magnitudes. Although controversial for economists, 
this proposition simply observes that “Energy is the only universal currency: one of its many 
forms must be transformed to another in order for stars to shine, planets to rotate, plants to 
grow, and civilizations to evolve” (Smil, 1999). 
This perspective does not support an energy theory of value or an energy transfer theory of 
value. First, means as energy transfers do not imply valuations that are independent from human 
ends. Material rearrangements become goods and energy transfers means only if they further 
human ends. Furthermore, marginal energy transfers are goods’ opportunity cost, and therefore a 
                                                          
4
 Making such specification in Knight (1935), page nine, second paragraph, is highly illuminating.  
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comparison that respects the chief notion that nothing can be valuable without reference to 
something else. Whatever marginal energy transfers are revealed in a given economy, they are 
specific to the ends sought by the unique human beings constituting it, and on the factors 
influencing the scarcity of energy transfers in a given place and time. Second, although nominal 
prices represent marginal energy transfers, such magnitudes depend on an array of variables 
apart from direct energy transfers and the scarcity of prime movers. Marginal energy transfers of 
final goods also depend on the MRS between goods and energy surplus, and those of energy 
goods and prime movers on the agent’s time preferences. If anything, this perspective 
harmonizes objective and subjective schools of economic value by recognizing human ends as 
the driver of economic activity, and energy transfers as the means to fulfill them. 
Further clarifications are in order on why this perspective does not support an energy theory of 
value, and how it responds to the issues put forth in Alessio (1981), Hertzmark (1981), Huettner 
(1976, 1981) and others. First, this perspective highlights energy transfers and not energy as the 
ultimately scarce resource, and notes that energy transfer is a process done by prime movers 
using energy goods while supported by a host of other factors such as water, infrastructure, 
social norms, etc. Second, there is nothing in the model requiring the scarcity of energy goods to 
intensify over time. This is likely to happen, and is required for a long run equilibrium to exist, 
but a society that manages to produce ever more energy goods at constant marginal energy 
transfers will simply grow indefinitely. Third, there is no suggestion that a pure physical energy 
analysis is superior to a monetary analysis. On the contrary, monetary magnitudes are 
expressions of underlying energy flows, and thus conventional economic analysis is energy 
analysis in disguise. Fourth, price levels and relative prices are not dependent on supply alone, as 
marginal energy transfers depend on intra and inter-temporal preferences. Fifth, time preferences 
heavily weight on the marginal energy transfers of energy goods and prime movers. Sixth, 
marginal energy transfers take into consideration all inputs required to produce a good, not only 
the energy goods and prime movers used in production. If an input (e.g. water) becomes scarce 
in some place and time, this means that more energy transfers are required to obtain it, which 
affects the marginal energy transfers of all goods using it. Seventh, technology plays a major role 
influencing marginal energy transfers and the magnitude of energy surplus. The disruptions of 
discoveries and inventions such as electricity and the induction motor are not analyzed because 
uncertainty was ruled out, not because they cannot fit within the model. 
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The model provides several secondary results. Energy transfers as a forward-looking measure of 
energy flow contrasts with the conventional backward-looking concept of embodied energy, and 
thus has stronger economic intuition. Similarly, a prime mover’s marginal energy transfer (and 
nominal price) equals the discounted future energy surplus it will generate. Moreover, an 
endogenous discount factor and its relation to the agent’s mEROI provides a new perspective on 
interest rates as the bridge between a society’s impatience and opportunity. Lastly, the logical 
sequence leading to the use of real and nominal money provides a definition of inflation that is 
partially different to its conventional understanding. 
Recognizing means as energy transfers has consequences that exceed the interpretation of the 
proportionality under study. Viewing nominal prices as representations of marginal energy 
transfers adds a new layer to microeconomic analysis. This is irrelevant if nominal prices are 
given, yet has implications when they are unreliable or nonexistent as with market power, price 
formation, and nonmarket valuation. Furthermore, this layer provides a new micro-foundation 
for macroeconomics, with implications for the understanding of growth, interest rates, inflation, 
and inequality. Proper accounts of these implications are future research avenues. 
The model’s limitations provide other topics for further research. Excluding energy goods and 
prime movers from agents’ utility functions implies a relatively low loss of generality, yet their 
inclusion would yield a more general framework. More generality could also be obtained with 
the inclusion of institutional and environmental factors that influence economies and markets. 
Although such factors only stimulate or obstruct the fundamental tendencies that the current 
model describes, a complete description of nominal prices should consider them. Finally, the 
model is set up without uncertainty, market power, or other prominent features of real world 
economies. Given the use of conventional economic rationale, extensions considering choice 
under uncertainty, game theory, and monopolies should follow seemly. 
5. Conclusion 
Nominal prices are proportional to average embodied energies because marginal energy transfers 
measure goods’ opportunity costs, and because energy transfers and embodied energies are 
related concepts of energy flows. These results derive from recognizing energy transfers as the 
means available to human purpose, the relevance of an autarkic agent’s energy transfer 
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constraint, and the role that prime movers play in production. These deviations from standard 
theory are the basis to interpret the proportionality under study, and to include energy within 
neoclassical micro theory. Understanding nominal prices as social representations of underlying 
marginal energy transfers provides a new layer to microeconomics and a new micro-foundation 
to macroeconomics, with implications for interest rates, inflation, growth, and among others, 
inequality. At a broader level, such understanding suggests a perspective of economics as an 
interplay between human desires and thermodynamic processes. 
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Appendix 
Part A. Energy transfer minimization 
This secondary objective for the agent takes the form 
    𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝒙𝑘,𝑡
  𝜺′𝒙𝑘,𝑡,                ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡                             (A.1) 
subject to the productive targets 
𝑓𝑘,𝑡(𝒙𝑘,𝑡) = ?̅?𝑘,𝑡,    ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡                        (A.2) 
and the prime mover constraints  
            ∑ 𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 ≤ ?̃?𝑙,𝑡,    ∀ 𝑙, 𝑡           (A.3) 
where 𝜺′𝒙𝑘,𝑡 is the direct energy transferred to produce 𝑄𝑘,𝑡, ?̅?𝑘,𝑡 is the target of production of 
good 𝑘 during 𝑡, and 𝑓𝑘,𝑡(∙) is a concave from above, continuous, and twice-differentiable 
production function. Also, 𝒙𝑘,𝑡 = [𝑥1,𝑘,𝑡, … , 𝑥𝐿,𝑘,𝑡]′ is the set of prime movers used to achieve 
such production and ?̃?𝑙,𝑡 is the agent’s availability of prime mover 𝑙 during 𝑡. 
The objective and production functions only include prime movers because — in an autarkic 
setting — prime movers contain all other inputs. Supporting inputs (e.g. desks, warehouses, 
transmission lines) are subsumed by a given prime mover endowment because ?̃?𝑙 includes 
everything required to transfer energy. Energy inputs (e.g. rice, gasoline, electricity) are 
accounted for by prime mover’s 𝜺 as prime mover’s energy transfer is a transferal of energy 
goods’ energy content. Furthermore, there are no intermediate inputs because the agent runs the 
entire productive chains, and raw materials need not be considered as they are spontaneous 
material arrangements that the agent finds in nature. Finally, the opportunity cost of prime 
movers themselves is factored in through prime mover constraints as shown below.  
The minimization of 𝜺′𝒙𝑘,𝑡 given ?̅?𝑘,𝑡 and ?̃?𝑙,𝑡 ∀ 𝑙, 𝑡 is done by modifying conventional cost 
minimization procedures described in Silberberg & Suen (2001) or similar. The relevant 
Lagrangian at 𝑡 = 1 is 
 ℒ𝑘 = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑡𝜺
′𝒙𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 + ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑡𝜏𝑘,𝑡[?̅?𝑘.𝑡 − 𝑓𝑘,𝑡(𝒙𝑘,𝑡)]
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑇
𝑡=1  
                         − ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑡𝜙𝑙,𝑡(?̃?𝑙,𝑡 − ∑ 𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 )
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,                        (A.4) 
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where each good’s marginal energy transfer appears as the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
its productive target constraint because it is goods’ opportunity cost. Each energy flow is 
multiplied by its corresponding marginal utility of energy because the primary objective of the 
agent is to maximize utility, not some energy flow per se. The FOC to choose the optimal 
quantity of prime mover 𝑙 to produce good 𝑘 in period 𝑡 > 0 is 
              𝜏𝑘,𝑡𝑓𝑙,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝜀𝑙 + 𝜙𝑙,𝑡,             ∀ 𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑡          (A.5) 
where 𝑓𝑙,𝑘,𝑡 is the marginal productivity of prime mover 𝑙 in the production of good 𝑘 in period 𝑡, 
and 𝜙𝑙,𝑡 is its power scarcity cost in that period. Multiplying (A.5) by 𝑔−𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
′  (the inverse of 𝑓𝑙,𝑘,𝑡) 
and averaging over 𝑙 yields the expression for marginal energy transfer in (7). 
The resolution of the Lagrangian in (A.4) involves a system of 𝐿2 ∙ 𝐾2 ∙ 𝑇3 equations and 
unknowns (the 𝜆𝑡 are exogeneous for the agent as a producer). This system, even in its simpler 
versions (e.g. 𝐿 = 2;  𝐾 = 2;  𝑇 = 3), has no closed form solution under conventional functional 
forms of the production function. Numerical approximations are required to obtain optimal prime 
mover demands, marginal energy transfers, and power scarcity costs. 
Part B. Energy surplus maximization 
This secondary objective for the agent takes the form 
           𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑸𝑒,𝑡 𝐸𝑡 = 𝛿𝑒𝑄𝑒,𝑡−1 − 𝜺
′𝒙𝑒,𝑡,              ∀ 𝑒, 𝑡     (B.1) 
subject to the prime mover constraints 
               ∑ 𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 ≤ ?̃?𝑙,𝑡,   ∀ 𝑙, 𝑡      (B.2) 
where 𝑄𝑒,𝑡−1 is the quantity of energy good 𝑒 produced in period 𝑡 − 1 and available in 𝑡 and 
𝑄𝑒,0 is the initial endowment of the good. The relevant Lagrangian at 𝑡 = 1 is defined as 
          ℒ𝑒 = ∑ 𝜆𝑡[∑ (𝛿𝑒𝑄𝑒,𝑡−1 − 𝜺
′𝒙𝑒,𝑡)
𝜖
𝑒=1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑙,𝑡(?̃?𝑙,𝑡 − ∑ 𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 )
𝐿
𝑙=1 ]
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,           (B.3) 
where the multiplication of each energy flow by its corresponding marginal utility of energy 
responds to the idea that energy surplus maximization is a Pareto-efficient condition for utility 
maximization. 
The FOC to choose the optimal quantity of energy good 𝑒 in period 𝑡 > 0 indicates that energy 
goods’ marginal energy transfers equals their discounted energy income 
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𝜏𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡,1𝛿𝑒 .     ∀ 𝑒 ∈ 𝜖    (B.4) 
Given 𝛽𝑡,1 = 𝜆𝑡+1 𝜆𝑡⁄ , equation (B.4) implies that the utility the agent derives from producing an 
additional unit of an energy good in period 𝑡 + 1 (𝜆𝑡+1𝛿𝑒) equals the utility forgone due to its 
production in 𝑡 (𝜆𝑡𝜏𝑒,𝑡). Also, the condition implies that all energy goods have the same marginal 
Energy Return Over Energy Investment (𝑚𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑒/𝜏𝑒,𝑡) ∀ 𝑒, 𝑡, yet not necessarily the 
same average Energy Return Over Energy Investment (𝑎𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑒/𝜏𝑒,𝑡
𝐴 ).5 This definition of 
𝑚𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼 implies that 𝛽𝑡,1 = 1/𝑚𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑒,𝑡 ∀ 𝑒, and thus a relation between the agent’s time 
preferences, interest rate, and opportunities to increase energy transfers in the future. 
The resolution of the Lagrangian in (B.3) involves a system of 𝐿 ∙ 𝜖 ∙ 𝑇3 equations and 
unknowns. The equations representing the FOC with respect to 𝜙𝑙,𝑡 are identical to the ones in 
the previous section, and thus provide no additional information. This system can be solved by 
considering 𝜙𝑙,𝑡 exogeneous and the optimization based on energy transfers instead of direct 
energy transfers and prime mover constraints. The system yields optimal production of energy 
goods and the agent’s entire schedule of energy surplus. 
Prime movers’ power scarcity cost is their marginal energy surplus, which is found replacing 
𝑄𝑒,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑒,𝑡(𝒙𝑒,𝑡) in (B.3). Deriving such expression with respect to any prime mover 𝑥𝑙,𝑒,𝑡, and 
averaging over 𝑒 shows that prime mover 𝑙’s power scarcity cost is  
       𝜙𝑙,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡,1
1
𝜖
∑ (𝛿𝑒𝑓𝑙,𝑒,𝑡 − 𝜀𝑙)
𝜖
𝑒=1 ,   ∀ 𝑙       (B.5) 
where the right-hand side is 𝑙’s discounted marginal energy surplus secured on average across all 
energy goods. This surplus provides the incentive for the agent to accumulate prime movers. 
Part C. Optimal prime mover accumulation 
This secondary objective for the agent takes the form  
                           𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑸𝑙,𝑡 𝜉𝐿 = ∑ ∑ [𝜙𝑙,𝑡(?̃?𝑙,𝑡 − ∑ 𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 ) − 𝐷𝑙,𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ],     (C.1) 
where 𝜉𝐿 is a quasi-energy surplus that indicates the energy balance between energy income and 
transfers associated with prime mover production. 𝜉𝐿 is a quasi-surplus because prime movers do 
not provide an energy income directly. Therefore, 𝜉𝐿 is a transferal of energy surplus from 
                                                          
5
 See Hall (2017) for a review on EROI. 
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energy sectors to non-energy sectors. Equation (C.1) implies that given a schedule of 𝜙𝑙,𝑡 and of 
prime mover use (𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡), the agent chooses the quantity of prime movers to be produced to 
maximize energy surplus. Production of prime movers appear in (C.1) because prime mover 
endowment is 
          ?̃?𝑙,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑑𝑙
𝑖𝑄𝑙,𝑡−1−𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=0 ,             ∀ 𝑙, 𝑡      (C.2) 
where 𝑄𝑙,𝑡−1−𝑖 is the quantity of prime mover 𝑙 produced in period 𝑡 − 1 − 𝑖, and 𝑄𝑙,0 is its initial 
endowment. Replacing (C.2) in (C.1) and including 𝜆𝑡 as done above for all energy flows implies 
that the relevant Lagrangian at 𝑡 = 1 is 
    ℒ𝑙 = ∑ 𝜆𝑡 ∑ [𝜙𝑙,𝑡(∑ 𝑑𝑙
𝑖𝑄𝑙,𝑡−1−𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=0 − ∑ 𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 ) − 𝐷𝑙,𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ].           (C.3) 
The FOC to choose the optimal quantity of prime mover 𝑙 in period 𝑡 > 0 indicates that, in 
equilibrium, prime movers’ marginal energy transfer equals the discounted net sum of the energy 
surplus they provide over their lifetime 
∑ 𝛽𝑡,𝑖𝜙𝑙,𝑖+1𝑑𝑙
𝑖−1𝑇
𝑖=1 = 𝜏𝑙,𝑡.  ∀ 𝑙, 𝑡                (C.4) 
Given 𝛽𝑡,𝑖 = 𝜆𝑡+𝑖 𝜆𝑡⁄ , the condition equates the utility the agent derives in all future periods from 
producing an additional unit of a prime mover in 𝑡 (∑ 𝜆𝑖+1𝜙𝑙,𝑖+1𝑑𝑙
𝑖−1𝑇
𝑖=1  ) to the utility forgone 
due to its production in that period (𝜆1𝜏𝑙,𝑡). The condition also yields prime mover’s optimal 
production in each period, prime movers endowment for the next one, and the agent’s aggregate 
power rate 𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑝𝑙?̃?𝑙,𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1 . 
The resolution of the Lagrangian in (C.3) involves a system of 𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 equations and unknowns. 
This system can be easily solved based on energy transfers instead of direct energy transfers and 
prime mover constraints. The system yields optimal production of prime movers and the agent’s 
entire schedule of power. 
Part D. Allocation of energy surplus 
This secondary objective for the agent takes the form  
     𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑄𝑓,𝑡 𝜉𝐹 = Λ𝑓,𝑡𝑄𝑓,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑓,𝑡, ∀ 𝑓, 𝑡         (D.1) 
subject to the prime mover constraints 
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               ∑ 𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 ≤ ?̃?𝑙,𝑡,  ∀ 𝑙, 𝑡      (D.2) 
and the energy assignment constraint 
∑ Λ𝑓,𝑡𝑄𝑓,𝑡
𝐹
𝑓=1 ≤ 𝐸𝑡 ,   ∀ 𝑡      (D.3) 
where 𝚲𝑡 = [Λ1,𝑡, … , Λ𝐹,𝑡]′ is the unitary energy assigned by the agent to the production of final 
goods. The last constraint binds the total energy assigned in the production of all final goods to 
the agent’s energy surplus. The relevant Lagrangian at 𝑡 = 1 is 
      ℒ𝑓 = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑡(Λ𝑓𝑄𝑓,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑓,𝑡)
𝐹
𝑓=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 + ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑡𝜙𝑙,𝑡(?̃?𝑙,𝑡 − ∑ 𝑥𝑙,𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 )
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝑇
𝑡=1  
                                    + ∑ 𝜆𝑡Θ𝑡(𝐸𝑡 − ∑ Λ𝑓,𝑡𝑄𝑓,𝑡
𝐹
𝑓=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ),                         (D.4) 
where Θ𝑡 ∈ [0,1) is a measure of the agent’s over-assignment of energy surplus during 𝑡. The 
FOC to choose the optimal quantity of good 𝑓 during 𝑡 shows that in equilibrium marginal 
energy transfers of final goods equal effective energy assignment 
𝜏𝑓,𝑡 = (1 − Θ𝑡)Λ𝑓,𝑡.   ∀ 𝑓, 𝑡       (D.5) 
This solution ensures that, given 𝚲𝑡 , the agent produces the maximum amount of final goods 
while complying with energy assignment and prime mover constraints. The resolution of the 
Lagrangian in (D.4) involves a system of 𝐿 ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝑇3 equations and unknowns. The system yields 
optimal production of final goods and the schedule of over-assignment of energy. 
